mirror of
https://github.com/infiniteCable2/panda.git
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Ford: add safety code for LCA vehicles (#966)
* Ford: add CAN messages and signal definitions * Ford: implement safety hooks * Ford: add safety unit tests * Use standstill signal * Rename bus Co-authored-by: Adeeb Shihadeh <adeebshihadeh@gmail.com> * Simplify brake pressed Co-authored-by: Adeeb Shihadeh <adeebshihadeh@gmail.com> * Ford LKAS msg helper * Simplify button violation check Co-authored-by: Adeeb Shihadeh <adeebshihadeh@gmail.com> * Simplify LKAS action check Co-authored-by: Adeeb Shihadeh <adeebshihadeh@gmail.com> * Tidy up tests * Use standstill signal for tests * Misra fix * Unused definition Co-authored-by: Adeeb Shihadeh <adeebshihadeh@gmail.com> * Simplify signal bit shifting * Remove type hints * Add panda safety type hints * Fix vehicle moving signal * Fix button checks * Fix steer allowed tests * Fix standstill threshold in tests * Maybe this works? * More button tests * Revert "Simplify button violation check" This reverts commit c6496269844328a007ea52b5766501d7c1ea40c2. Co-authored-by: Adeeb Shihadeh <adeebshihadeh@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Cameron Clough
@@ -1,69 +1,84 @@
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// board enforces
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// in-state
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// accel set/resume
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// out-state
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// cancel button
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// accel rising edge
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// brake rising edge
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// brake > 0mph
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// Safety-relevant CAN messages for Ford vehicles.
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#define MSG_ENG_BRAKE_DATA 0x165 // RX from PCM, for driver brake pedal and cruise state
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#define MSG_ENG_VEHICLE_SP_THROTTLE 0x204 // RX from PCM, for driver throttle input
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#define MSG_DESIRED_TORQ_BRK 0x213 // RX from ABS, for standstill state
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#define MSG_STEERING_DATA_FD1 0x083 // TX by OP, ACC control buttons for cancel
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#define MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1 0x3CA // TX by OP, Lane Keeping Assist
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#define MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL 0x3D3 // TX by OP, Lane Centering Assist
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#define MSG_IPMA_DATA 0x3D8 // TX by OP, IPMA HUD user interface
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// CAN bus numbers.
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#define FORD_MAIN_BUS 0U
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#define FORD_CAM_BUS 2U
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const CanMsg FORD_TX_MSGS[] = {
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{MSG_STEERING_DATA_FD1, 0, 8},
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{MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1, 0, 8},
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{MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL, 0, 8},
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{MSG_IPMA_DATA, 0, 8},
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};
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#define FORD_TX_LEN (sizeof(FORD_TX_MSGS) / sizeof(FORD_TX_MSGS[0]))
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AddrCheckStruct ford_addr_checks[] = {
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{.msg = {{MSG_ENG_BRAKE_DATA, 0, 8, .expected_timestep = 100000U}, { 0 }, { 0 }}},
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{.msg = {{MSG_ENG_VEHICLE_SP_THROTTLE, 0, 8, .expected_timestep = 10000U}, { 0 }, { 0 }}},
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{.msg = {{MSG_DESIRED_TORQ_BRK, 0, 8, .expected_timestep = 20000U}, { 0 }, { 0 }}},
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};
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#define FORD_ADDR_CHECK_LEN (sizeof(ford_addr_checks) / sizeof(ford_addr_checks[0]))
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addr_checks ford_rx_checks = {ford_addr_checks, FORD_ADDR_CHECK_LEN};
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static int ford_rx_hook(CANPacket_t *to_push) {
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int addr = GET_ADDR(to_push);
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int bus = GET_BUS(to_push);
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bool alt_exp_allow_gas = alternative_experience & ALT_EXP_DISABLE_DISENGAGE_ON_GAS;
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if (addr == 0x217) {
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// wheel speeds are 14 bits every 16
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vehicle_moving = false;
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for (int i = 0; i < 8; i += 2) {
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vehicle_moving |= GET_BYTE(to_push, i) | (GET_BYTE(to_push, (int)(i + 1)) & 0xFCU);
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}
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}
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// state machine to enter and exit controls
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if (addr == 0x83) {
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bool cancel = GET_BYTE(to_push, 1) & 0x1U;
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bool set_or_resume = GET_BYTE(to_push, 3) & 0x30U;
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if (cancel) {
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controls_allowed = 0;
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}
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if (set_or_resume) {
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controls_allowed = 1;
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}
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}
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// exit controls on rising edge of brake press or on brake press when
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// speed > 0
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if (addr == 0x165) {
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brake_pressed = GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) & 0x20U;
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if (brake_pressed && (!brake_pressed_prev || vehicle_moving)) {
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controls_allowed = 0;
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}
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brake_pressed_prev = brake_pressed;
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}
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// exit controls on rising edge of gas press
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if (addr == 0x204) {
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gas_pressed = ((GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) & 0x03U) | GET_BYTE(to_push, 1)) != 0U;
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if (!alt_exp_allow_gas && gas_pressed && !gas_pressed_prev) {
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controls_allowed = 0;
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}
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gas_pressed_prev = gas_pressed;
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}
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if ((safety_mode_cnt > RELAY_TRNS_TIMEOUT) && (bus == 0) && (addr == 0x3CA)) {
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relay_malfunction_set();
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}
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return 1;
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static bool ford_lkas_msg_check(int addr) {
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return (addr == MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1)
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|| (addr == MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL)
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|| (addr == MSG_IPMA_DATA);
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}
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// all commands: just steering
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// if controls_allowed and no pedals pressed
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// allow all commands up to limit
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// else
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// block all commands that produce actuation
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static int ford_rx_hook(CANPacket_t *to_push) {
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bool valid = addr_safety_check(to_push, &ford_rx_checks, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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if (valid && (GET_BUS(to_push) == FORD_MAIN_BUS)) {
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int addr = GET_ADDR(to_push);
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// Update in motion state from standstill signal
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if (addr == MSG_DESIRED_TORQ_BRK) {
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// Signal: VehStop_D_Stat
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vehicle_moving = ((GET_BYTE(to_push, 3) >> 3) & 0x3U) == 0U;
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}
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// Update gas pedal
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if (addr == MSG_ENG_VEHICLE_SP_THROTTLE) {
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// Pedal position: (0.1 * val) in percent
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// Signal: ApedPos_Pc_ActlArb
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gas_pressed = (((GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) & 0x03U) << 8) | GET_BYTE(to_push, 1)) > 0U;
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}
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// Update brake pedal and cruise state
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if (addr == MSG_ENG_BRAKE_DATA) {
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// Signal: BpedDrvAppl_D_Actl
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brake_pressed = ((GET_BYTE(to_push, 0) >> 4) & 0x3U) == 2U;
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// Signal: CcStat_D_Actl
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unsigned int cruise_state = GET_BYTE(to_push, 1) & 0x07U;
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bool cruise_engaged = (cruise_state == 4U) || (cruise_state == 5U);
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// Enter controls on rising edge of stock ACC, exit controls if stock ACC disengages
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if (cruise_engaged && !cruise_engaged_prev) {
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controls_allowed = true;
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}
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if (!cruise_engaged) {
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controls_allowed = false;
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}
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cruise_engaged_prev = cruise_engaged;
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}
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// If steering controls messages are received on the destination bus, it's an indication
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// that the relay might be malfunctioning.
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generic_rx_checks(ford_lkas_msg_check(addr));
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}
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return valid;
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}
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static int ford_tx_hook(CANPacket_t *to_send, bool longitudinal_allowed) {
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UNUSED(longitudinal_allowed);
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@@ -71,29 +86,45 @@ static int ford_tx_hook(CANPacket_t *to_send, bool longitudinal_allowed) {
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int tx = 1;
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int addr = GET_ADDR(to_send);
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// disallow actuator commands if gas or brake (with vehicle moving) are pressed
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// and the the latching controls_allowed flag is True
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int pedal_pressed = brake_pressed_prev && vehicle_moving;
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bool alt_exp_allow_gas = alternative_experience & ALT_EXP_DISABLE_DISENGAGE_ON_GAS;
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if (!alt_exp_allow_gas) {
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pedal_pressed = pedal_pressed || gas_pressed_prev;
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if (!msg_allowed(to_send, FORD_TX_MSGS, FORD_TX_LEN)) {
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tx = 0;
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}
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bool current_controls_allowed = controls_allowed && !(pedal_pressed);
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// STEER: safety check
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if (addr == 0x3CA) {
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if (!current_controls_allowed) {
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// bits 7-4 need to be 0xF to disallow lkas commands
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if ((GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) & 0xF0U) != 0xF0U) {
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tx = 0;
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}
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// Cruise button check, only allow cancel button to be sent
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if (addr == MSG_STEERING_DATA_FD1) {
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// Violation if any button other than cancel is pressed
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// Signal: CcAslButtnCnclPress
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bool violation = (GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) |
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(GET_BYTE(to_send, 1) & 0xFEU) |
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GET_BYTE(to_send, 2) |
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GET_BYTE(to_send, 3) |
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GET_BYTE(to_send, 4) |
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GET_BYTE(to_send, 5)) != 0U;
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if (violation) {
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tx = 0;
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}
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}
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// FORCE CANCEL: safety check only relevant when spamming the cancel button
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// ensuring that set and resume aren't sent
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if (addr == 0x83) {
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if ((GET_BYTE(to_send, 3) & 0x30U) != 0U) {
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// Safety check for Lane_Assist_Data1 action
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if (addr == MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1) {
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// Do not allow steering using Lane_Assist_Data1 (Lane-Departure Aid).
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// This message must be sent for Lane Centering to work, and can include
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// values such as the steering angle or lane curvature for debugging,
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// but the action (LkaActvStats_D2_Req) must be set to zero.
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unsigned int action = GET_BYTE(to_send, 0) >> 5;
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if (action != 0U) {
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tx = 0;
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}
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}
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// Safety check for LateralMotionControl action
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if (addr == MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL) {
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// Signal: LatCtl_D_Rq
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unsigned int steer_control_type = (GET_BYTE(to_send, 4) >> 2) & 0x7U;
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bool steer_control_enabled = steer_control_type != 0U;
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// No steer control allowed when controls are not allowed
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if (!controls_allowed && steer_control_enabled) {
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tx = 0;
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}
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}
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@@ -102,12 +133,43 @@ static int ford_tx_hook(CANPacket_t *to_send, bool longitudinal_allowed) {
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return tx;
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}
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// TODO: keep camera on bus 2 and make a fwd_hook
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static int ford_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CANPacket_t *to_fwd) {
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int addr = GET_ADDR(to_fwd);
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int bus_fwd = -1;
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switch (bus_num) {
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case FORD_MAIN_BUS: {
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// Forward all traffic from bus 0 onward
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bus_fwd = FORD_CAM_BUS;
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break;
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}
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case FORD_CAM_BUS: {
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// Block stock LKAS messages
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if (!ford_lkas_msg_check(addr)) {
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bus_fwd = FORD_MAIN_BUS;
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}
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break;
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}
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default: {
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// No other buses should be in use; fallback to do-not-forward
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bus_fwd = -1;
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break;
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}
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}
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return bus_fwd;
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}
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static const addr_checks* ford_init(uint16_t param) {
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UNUSED(param);
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return &ford_rx_checks;
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}
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const safety_hooks ford_hooks = {
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.init = nooutput_init,
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.init = ford_init,
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.rx = ford_rx_hook,
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.tx = ford_tx_hook,
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.tx_lin = nooutput_tx_lin_hook,
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.fwd = default_fwd_hook,
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.fwd = ford_fwd_hook,
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};
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import os
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from typing import List
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from cffi import FFI
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can_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
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@@ -65,11 +66,69 @@ bool addr_checks_valid();
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void init_tests(void);
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void init_tests_honda(void);
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void set_honda_fwd_brake(bool);
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void set_honda_alt_brake_msg(bool);
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void set_honda_fwd_brake(bool c);
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void set_honda_alt_brake_msg(bool c);
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void set_honda_bosch_long(bool c);
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int get_honda_hw(void);
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""")
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libpandasafety = ffi.dlopen(libpandasafety_fn)
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class CANPacket:
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reserved: int
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bus: int
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data_len_code: int
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rejected: int
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returned: int
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extended: int
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addr: int
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data: List[int]
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class PandaSafety:
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def set_controls_allowed(self, c: bool) -> None: ...
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def get_controls_allowed(self) -> bool: ...
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def get_longitudinal_allowed(self) -> bool: ...
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def set_alternative_experience(self, mode: int) -> None: ...
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def get_alternative_experience(self) -> int: ...
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def set_relay_malfunction(self, c: bool) -> None: ...
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def get_relay_malfunction(self) -> bool: ...
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def set_gas_interceptor_detected(self, c: bool) -> None: ...
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def get_gas_interceptor_detected(self) -> bool: ...
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def get_gas_interceptor_prev(self) -> int: ...
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def get_gas_pressed_prev(self) -> bool: ...
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def get_brake_pressed_prev(self) -> bool: ...
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def get_acc_main_on(self) -> bool: ...
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def set_torque_meas(self, min: int, max: int) -> None: ... # pylint: disable=redefined-builtin
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def get_torque_meas_min(self) -> int: ...
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def get_torque_meas_max(self) -> int: ...
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def set_torque_driver(self, min: int, max: int) -> None: ... # pylint: disable=redefined-builtin
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def get_torque_driver_min(self) -> int: ...
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def get_torque_driver_max(self) -> int: ...
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def set_desired_torque_last(self, t: int) -> None: ...
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def set_rt_torque_last(self, t: int) -> None: ...
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def set_desired_angle_last(self, t: int) -> None: ...
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def get_cruise_engaged_prev(self) -> bool: ...
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def get_vehicle_moving(self) -> bool: ...
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def get_hw_type(self) -> int: ...
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def set_timer(self, t: int) -> None: ...
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def safety_rx_hook(self, to_send: CANPacket) -> int: ...
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def safety_tx_hook(self, to_push: CANPacket) -> int: ...
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def safety_fwd_hook(self, bus_num: int, to_fwd: CANPacket) -> int: ...
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def set_safety_hooks(self, mode: int, param: int) -> int: ...
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def safety_tick_current_rx_checks(self) -> None: ...
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def addr_checks_valid(self) -> bool: ...
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def init_tests(self) -> None: ...
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def init_tests_honda(self) -> None: ...
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def set_honda_fwd_brake(self, c: bool) -> None: ...
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def set_honda_alt_brake_msg(self, c: bool) -> None: ...
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def set_honda_bosch_long(self, c: bool) -> None: ...
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def get_honda_hw(self) -> int: ...
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libpandasafety: PandaSafety = ffi.dlopen(libpandasafety_fn)
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114
tests/safety/test_ford.py
Normal file
114
tests/safety/test_ford.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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import unittest
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import panda.tests.safety.common as common
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from panda import Panda
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from panda.tests.safety import libpandasafety_py
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from panda.tests.safety.common import CANPackerPanda
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MSG_ENG_BRAKE_DATA = 0x165 # RX from PCM, for driver brake pedal and cruise state
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MSG_ENG_VEHICLE_SP_THROTTLE2 = 0x202 # RX from PCM, for vehicle speed
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MSG_ENG_VEHICLE_SP_THROTTLE = 0x204 # RX from PCM, for driver throttle input
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MSG_STEERING_DATA_FD1 = 0x083 # TX by OP, ACC control buttons for cancel
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MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1 = 0x3CA # TX by OP, Lane Keeping Assist
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MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL = 0x3D3 # TX by OP, Lane Centering Assist
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MSG_IPMA_DATA = 0x3D8 # TX by OP, IPMA HUD user interface
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class TestFordSafety(common.PandaSafetyTest):
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STANDSTILL_THRESHOLD = 1
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RELAY_MALFUNCTION_ADDR = MSG_IPMA_DATA
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RELAY_MALFUNCTION_BUS = 0
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TX_MSGS = [[MSG_STEERING_DATA_FD1, 0], [MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1, 0], [MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL, 0], [MSG_IPMA_DATA, 0]]
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FWD_BLACKLISTED_ADDRS = {2: [MSG_LANE_ASSIST_DATA1, MSG_LATERAL_MOTION_CONTROL, MSG_IPMA_DATA]}
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FWD_BUS_LOOKUP = {0: 2, 2: 0}
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def setUp(self):
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self.packer = CANPackerPanda("ford_lincoln_base_pt")
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self.safety = libpandasafety_py.libpandasafety
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self.safety.set_safety_hooks(Panda.SAFETY_FORD, 0)
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self.safety.init_tests()
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# Driver brake pedal
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def _user_brake_msg(self, brake: bool):
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# brake pedal and cruise state share same message, so we have to send
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# the other signal too
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enable = self.safety.get_controls_allowed()
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values = {
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"BpedDrvAppl_D_Actl": 2 if brake else 1,
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"CcStat_D_Actl": 5 if enable else 0,
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}
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return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("EngBrakeData", 0, values)
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# Standstill state
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def _speed_msg(self, speed: float):
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values = {"VehStop_D_Stat": 1 if speed <= self.STANDSTILL_THRESHOLD else 0}
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return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("DesiredTorqBrk", 0, values)
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# Drive throttle input
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def _user_gas_msg(self, gas: float):
|
||||
values = {"ApedPos_Pc_ActlArb": gas}
|
||||
return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("EngVehicleSpThrottle", 0, values)
|
||||
|
||||
# Cruise status
|
||||
def _pcm_status_msg(self, enable: bool):
|
||||
# brake pedal and cruise state share same message, so we have to send
|
||||
# the other signal too
|
||||
brake = self.safety.get_brake_pressed_prev()
|
||||
values = {
|
||||
"BpedDrvAppl_D_Actl": 2 if brake else 1,
|
||||
"CcStat_D_Actl": 5 if enable else 0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("EngBrakeData", 0, values)
|
||||
|
||||
# LKAS command
|
||||
def _lkas_command_msg(self, action: int):
|
||||
values = {
|
||||
"LkaActvStats_D2_Req": action,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("Lane_Assist_Data1", 0, values)
|
||||
|
||||
# TJA command
|
||||
def _tja_command_msg(self, enabled: bool):
|
||||
values = {
|
||||
"LatCtl_D_Rq": 1 if enabled else 0,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("LateralMotionControl", 0, values)
|
||||
|
||||
# Cruise control buttons
|
||||
def _acc_button_msg(self, cancel=0, resume=0, _set=0):
|
||||
values = {
|
||||
"CcAslButtnCnclPress": cancel,
|
||||
"CcAsllButtnResPress": resume,
|
||||
"CcAslButtnSetPress": _set,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return self.packer.make_can_msg_panda("Steering_Data_FD1", 0, values)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_steer_allowed(self):
|
||||
self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(self._tx(self._tja_command_msg(1)))
|
||||
self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
|
||||
|
||||
self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._tx(self._tja_command_msg(1)))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_prevent_lkas_action(self):
|
||||
self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._tx(self._lkas_command_msg(1)))
|
||||
|
||||
self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._tx(self._lkas_command_msg(1)))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_spam_cancel_safety_check(self):
|
||||
for allowed in (0, 1):
|
||||
self.safety.set_controls_allowed(allowed)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(self._tx(self._acc_button_msg(cancel=1)))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._tx(self._acc_button_msg(resume=1)))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(self._tx(self._acc_button_msg(_set=1)))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user